A long series of official reports testifies to the importance of maternal mortality as a social problem for most of the inter-war period.' A number of historians have studied its significance, with some reference to the "medicalization" of childbirth: most exhaustively, Jane Lewis, in connection with the politics of maternity care, and Irvine Loudon, in his reconsiderations of causality.2 The first part of this paper deals with the dimensions of this social problem, reviews explanations of the maternal mortality rates and the general lines of debates surrounding them, and identifies different views about the quality of maternity services and their relationship to maternal mortality.
with the dimensions of this social problem, reviews explanations of the maternal mortality rates and the general lines of debates surrounding them, and identifies different views about the quality of maternity services and their relationship to maternal mortality.
The second part explains what services were available, paying special attention to home confinements and attendance on them by midwives and general practitioners; it takes up the details of arguments advanced about their work and reviews the development of relevant policy in the late 1930s. The paper argues that the credit due to scientific and public health medicine for improving women's chances of life can be greatly offset by evidence that medical power was exerted in ways which favoured professional interests when they came into conflict with clients' welfare.
MATERNAL MORTALITY AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM
Maternal mortality means deaths due to pregnancy and childbirth.3 Its rates for England and Wales, expressed as numbers of deaths per 1,000 births, were 4.9 for 1851-1855 (the first five-year period for which civil registration permitted a reasonably reliable calculation) and 4.3 for 1931-1935, after which there was a sustained decline. Despite year-to-year fluctuations and changes in definitions, classifications, and the registration system's capacity for full recording, the rates were usually taken to mean that the risks of childbirth were fairly constant despite general improvements in the national health and supposedly beneficial changes in obstetric practices and maternity services. Dissenting from this conventional wisdom, Edward Shorter has claimed that antiseptic and aseptic techniques in use from the 1880s brought about reductions in the number of deaths from puerperal sepsis (the biggest single cause) that were obscured by increasing incidences of deaths not ascribed to the abortions that caused them; but Loudon's analysis supports convention.4 Contemporary observers' reservations about the influence of abortion on the maternal mortality rates were less to do with the deaths it brought about than with the changing, but incalculable relationship between the total numbers of pregnancies and of those taken to full term. Dr Andrew Topping, whose period of office as Medical Officer of Health for Rochdale from 1930 to 1932 marked a decline in the borough's maternal mortality rates from an annual average of just under 9 for 1928-1931 to 3 for 1932-1935, drew attention to the unsoundness of using the number of live births as a base for indicators of the risks of deaths from pregnancy and childbirth.5 But no matter how misleading the average, annual rates might have been, it was generally agreed that the numbers of deaths were well above the irreducible minimum; and the national averages concealed wide variations between different localities, which remained fairly steady from place to place and have never satisfactorily been explained. 6 The first person to recognize and state repeatedly that not only was the level of maternal mortality in England and Wales too high, but that many puerperal deaths were avoidable, was William Farr in his appendices to the Annual Reports of the Registrar General in the 1870s, but it was not until 1924 that the new Ministry of Health began systematically to address them. Reports in 1924 and 1927 by Dr Janet Campbell, its Medical Officer in charge of maternal and child welfare, led to complementary Departmental Committees, one on midwifery which reported in 1929, and the other on maternal mortality, reporting in 1930 and 1932.7 None of the Committees' reports resulted in new policy. 3The more precise term is "puerperal mortality", but "maternal mortality" was customary usage, as here defined. 4 Edward Shorter, A history of women's bodies, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984 (first publ. New York, Basic Books, 1982), p. 131; Loudon, 'Deaths in childbed', note 2 above, pp. 25-7. 5Andrew Topping, 'Maternal mortality and public opinion', Publ. Hlth, July 1936, 49: 342-9. 6 See Macfarlane and Cole, op. cit., note 2 above, and Loudon, 'Obstetric care' and 'Maternal mortality', note 2 above, for recent reviews. 7 This was not for want of recommendations. The Midwives Committee, set up because midwifery lacked recruits, sought to raise the status of a profession dependent on poor women's fees through a complicated plan for subsidizing independent midwifery out of National Insurance funds.8 The Maternal Mortality Committee, chaired by Sir George Newman, the Ministry's Chief Medical Officer, called for a National Maternity Service with midwives or maternity nurses for every case, doctors for examinations and attendances as required, consultants available on doctors' referrals, hospital beds as necessary, and adequate ancillary services such as transport, sterilized equipment, and laboratories.9 The two sets of proposals were predictable in principle if not in detail; the Maternal Mortality Committee's analyses of the causes of maternal deaths provided a powerful case for strengthening the health services centred upon local authorities, to which Newman was committed. They entailed mobilizing private and voluntary resources of health care; a sufficient supply of independent midwives to provide attendance within the means of poor women was crucial.
The Committees' ambitions foundered in an economic crisis, when "straitened circumstances" made it impossible for the Ministry to encourage or approve increased expenditure except in "very black areas".10 Further investigations into maternal mortality in places with especially high rates were put in hand as tokens of continuing concern; reports of their findings in 1937 coincided with the beginning of a substained decline in the national rates. Within a decade, maternal mortality lost its status as a social problem.
Its rehabilitation as an historical problem has been partly a matter of reconsidering questions of causality left unresolved with the rates' decline, and partly one of reviewing questions opened up by the Departmental Committees.
EXPLANATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
The Maternal Mortality Committee collected data on 5,805 maternal deaths between November 1928 and July 1932, but considered the findings of its Interim Report, 1930 , to be representative. They were based on the first 2,000 deaths; 404 were due to causes other than childbearing and the reports on 310 others were discarded as inadequate or not strictly relevant to the enquiry. Of the remaining 1,286 cases, 626 were ascribed to "primary avoidable causes", in the following proportions: "faulty antenatal care", 36.2 per cent; "error of judgement", 35.7 per cent; "lack of reasonable facilities", 10.2 per cent; and "negligence of patient or her friends", 17.9 per cent. The statistical categories are very broad and the allocation of cases to them is open to question, but the findings were presented as likely to have understated the extent of avoidable death because of the numbers of cases excluded for lack of information: it looked as though the mortality rates could be halved. Official reservations about the dangers of over-simplistic interpretations were not expressed until completion of the subsequent special investigations; the reports on them, in 1937, drew attention to the small, absolute number of deaths and warned against the vulgar error of expecting an easy progression from avoidability to avoidance, something for which both Topping and Sir Henry Brackenbury, arguing the case for a standardized system of maternity care, had already criticized the Committee. 11
Despite the general agreement about the need for improved services there was dispute about their organization and control. In 1929, and again in 1935 when there were further moves towards reform, the British Medical Association presented plans for maternity services centred on general practitioners rather than on local authorities' health departments.'2 More immediately and politically sensitive was the criticism of the official inquiries' concentration on clinical causes rather than on socio-economic factors, notably malnutrition, likely to bear on women's chances of surviving childbirth. Brackenbury's paper represented this line of argument, but it was most strongly taken up by the unofficial Maternal Mortality Committee which shadowed its Departmental counterpart.13 Fortuitously, the mortality rates declined, and controversy with them.
Sulphonamide drugs came into use in the late 1930s and reduced the level of puerperal fever that was the main, single cause of maternal deaths, although their introduction was not so well synchronized with the drop in the maternal mortality rates as indisputably to account for it. The incidence of maternal deaths from other causes also fell. In 1949, Sir William Gilliatt reviewed the decline alongside an analysis of maternal deaths in 1947 in order to identify the residue of deaths from specific, avoidable causes and to clarify the means of reducing maternal mortality even further.14 He credited chemotherapy for the breakthrough, with penicillin following the sulphonamides from the last year of the war. The category of puerperal sepsis included septic abortion, which was not susceptible to sulphonamides, and Loudon has now shown that the two components' different patterns of decline related to the introduction of the different drugs.15
Two other aspects of puerperal sepsis were considered; the virulence of the streptococcus and standards of asepsis and antisepsis. Gilliatt Blood transfusion, from the early years of the war, was the only clinical intervention specifically identified in connection with deaths from causes other than sepsis, but informed opinion suggested that it had not reached its maximum effect by the 1950s.22 Gilliatt's study included a detailed account of the standard procedures for preventing and replacing loss of blood, implying that even by 1949 they were not always followed. 23 Loudon allows malnutrition some small role in deaths from haemorrhage, which Gilliatt thought likely to have been the unrecorded but direct cause of some deaths attributed to other "accidents of childbirth" in 1947.24 Toxaemia was down by 55.5 per cent since 1927 but Gilliatt judged it capable of further reduction as the antenatal monitoring and dietary control that accounted for the improvement were not yet universally practised.25 This was his only explicit reference to diet as a causal factor, although it is implied in his opinion that the psychiatric conditions said to cause some deaths in the puerperium could be tempered by good physical health, and he said that improved wartime diet had contributed to the sustained, general decline in maternal mortality.26
Those who complained of the lack of official attention to malnutrition were ill-served by an experiment carried out in Glamorgan by the National Birthday 37 Loudon, 'Deaths in childbed', note 2 above, p. 39.
The extension of midwives' training at the end of the 1930s and the continuing trend towards institutional confinements, accounting for more than 50 per cent of births by the mid-I 940s, supports Loudon's attribution of some of the credit for the continuing postwar decline in maternal mortality to improvements in services, especially during the war.38 His criticism of prewar midwives is doubtfully grounded, relying partly on the assumption that trained midwifery meant better practice, an improvement that was constrained by the rate of decline of the licensed, but untrained midwife-the "bona fide" midwife discussed at more length in the second part of this paper-and he has interpreted Topping's experience as conclusive evidence of poor standards in the 1930s.39 In fact, Topping reported midwives' average standard to be good, and improving. He identified shortcomings in all the occupational groups involved with maternity care, including midwives, and although his criticism of consultants made special mention of those who did not speak out about the bad midwifery that they talked about in private, his reference seems, in context, to have been wholly or largely to general practitioners' midwifery.40 There was no correlational decline in the maternal mortality rates as the untrained midwives died out, and neither they nor trained midwives were especially implicated in the findings of the various inquiries into maternal deaths.
Loudon has cited the papers of the formal discussion which followed Gilliatt's address to the British Congress of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 1949, in support of his list of factors contributing to the continuing fall in maternal mortality rates into and through the 1940s, but they do not bear out his inclusion, among those factors, of "better education of medical students ... [and] greater cooperation between general practitioners and midwives and consultants .. "41 The Congress was opened by Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health, and some of those present took strong and concerted exception to his attribution of the continuing reduction in maternal death-rates "to teamwork in the maternity services of Great Britain".42 It was a provocative remark for Bevan to make the day after the National Health Service's first birthday, as its arrangements for maternity care represented his eleventh-hour retreat from plans for restricting general practitioners' midwifery to doctors with relevant postgraduate training or experience, which the obstetricians had long advocated.43 Nevertheless, the indignation which surfaced when Gilliatt's research was discussed does not invalidate his plea for domestic midwifery to be reinforced by practitioners with six months' residential experience, nor his fellow consultants' judgement that the quality of maternity care was in jeopardy.
Although the maternal mortality rates fell by 61 per cent over the twenty years to 1947, the rates for "accidents of childbirth" fell by only 24.6 per cent. Gilliatt general practitioners' ill-judged and unskilled interventions: "every year many mothers and many more babies pay with their lives. ..". It was argued in the discussion that codified regimes of antenatal care-knowledge of which had undoubtedly advanced over the previous twenty years-could be counterproductive if not in experienced hands; that midwives' training was now far better than that of the average newly-qualified doctor; and that the National Health Service's financial arrangements not only induced inexperienced general practitioners to take as many maternity patients as possible, but they gave local authorities incentives to encourage women to book doctors rather than midwives for home confinements.44
If such a debate could take place as late as 1949 and be adduced by a modern historian as evidence of services by then so superior as to have reduced women's risks of dying in childbirth, what were the services like when maternal mortality was a recognized social problem? The second part of this paper considers confinement arrangements, professional attendance on home births, and the reform of midwifery services at the end of the 1930s.
CONFINEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND COSTS
Assuming that unattended births were rare and that there was general compliance with the law prohibiting unlicensed attendance, childbirth was attended by consultant or specialist obstetricians, general practitioners, or midwives. The place of birth is no guide to the status of the birth attendant. Midwives worked in all types of maternity homes and hospitals.49 A home confinement did not necessarily mean delivery by the doctor or midwife booked for it. Delivery in a "doctor's case" might be by his maternity nurse, and a doctor might take over a "midwife's case" presenting complications. A maternity nurse with no midwifery qualification risked a £10 fine for undertaking a delivery except when there was "sudden and urgent necessity", but midwives, including those employed by district nursing associations, might act as maternity nurses.50 The rules of the Central Midwives Board required midwives to call doctors in cases of complications and, by the 1930s, medical aid was called in about one in every four cases.51 But the difficulty might have been overcome by the time the doctor arrived, or the midwife might have continued under his direction.
The law about unlicensed attendance was not always observed. Acknowledging a residue of illegal midwifery, the Midwives Committee reported in 1929 that further repressive legislation would be ineffective and that only a national midwifery service would eliminate it completely.52
The independent practice that, until 1936, was the basis of home midwifery could be supported and supplemented by local authorities, aided by grants from central government,53 but public funding could secure an adequate national service only to the extent that local powers were exploited. Any subsidies were for midwives, not mothers; any aid for the necessitous was in services, not cash. The maternity benefit available through National Insurance to women covered by their own or their husbands' contributions was meant to help with the general expenses of childbirth, not specifically with the costs of attendance, but it was sometimes invoked as a guide for setting fees.54 Resisting suggestions that it should be tied to midwifery, the Midwives Committee reported that, although the present need was for services, it saw no justification for changing the existing benefit and no reason to think it ill-used.55
The But this merely meant a short training period: three months to begin with, six from 1916 and twelve from 1926, less for trained nurses. As midwives trained in the 1920s were less likely to take up independent practice, which was popular for married part-timers, how much real difference in social characteristics and standards of practice there was between the domiciliary midwives of the early 1900s and those of the early 1930s is debatable. Midwifery was uncharted territory in 1902, when estimates of the numbers of practising midwives, varying from 9,000 to 15,000, were confounded by the CMB's initial enrolment of 22,308, of whom 9,787 had qualifications.62
It is difficult to know what to make of the "bona fide" midwives' reputed inadequacies. Accounts of an illiteracy rate of 37 per cent in Yorkshire midwives in 1905, and of insanitary practice there and in Cumberland in 1911, were typical; anecdotes about midwives' inability to use thermometers have been retailed to the point of tedium.63 The "bona fides" of the early 1900s were often described as unteachable on evidence that, unsurprisingly, shows them to have been unlettered. It might well be compared to the resistance, in 1908, to proposals for including a simple written examination in the major district nursing organization's scheme for training nurses in district work, on the grounds that it would discriminate against some candidates.64 All had to be hospital-trained to the best standards of the day before being accepted for the further training.
The worst "bona fides" were never said to be representative, but evidence has sometimes been misleadingly presented. For example, "In 1908, seventy-three per cent of midwives still practised without antiseptics and twelve per cent conformed to the drunken stereotype of Sarah Gamp" might be read as for all midwives.65 The statistics are from a report of the Medical Officer of Health for Hull, cited by Lewis, who has noted that many "bona fides" were skilled practitioners and that the CMB's rules protected against dangerous practice.66
Official inspection was supposed to provide some guarantee of midwifery standards and, whether or not these were better than before, J. S. Fairbairn's paper of 1927 provides some insight into them.67 Covering the period from 1905 to 1925, it was based on the midwifery records of district nursing associations co-ordinated by the Queen's Institute of District Nursing.
Fairbairn compared the maternal mortality rates recorded for women in the care of the nursing associations' midwives with the national rates for 1905-1925. After correcting for the differences between the associations' recording practices and civil registration, he concluded that their maternal mortality rates were about half the The nurse-midwives' rates of calls for medical aid had risen from 8.9 per cent in 1905 to 26 per cent in 1925. These included calls in pregnancy, in the puerperium, and on behalf of the baby but, in 1924 and 1925, about two-thirds were for difficulties and delays in labour and about half of these led to forceps deliveries. Nurse-midwives were scattered in rural districts all over the country and their medical aid came from local general practitioners.
In 1933, the obstetrician J. M. Munro Kerr prescribed a service of employed midwives; it was doubtful whether the Midwives Committee's recommendations for supporting independent midwives had ever been realistic.69 Whilst dissenting from the majority opinion in the British College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists that midwives should hold nursing qualifications, both Kerr and Fairbairn were disappointed by the rates of calls for aid: 30.7 per cent for the nurse-midwives in 1931.70 Fairbairn reckoned that midwives then in practice were less confident than their predecessors but Kerr disagreed, and emphasized that, "Probably it is due more to the demands for anaesthetics and operative interference by the patients and relatives"..71 Estimating forceps delivery to be necessary in no more than six to eight per cent of cases and comparing rates of 2.5 per cent at London's East End and York Road lying-in hospitals with the nurse-midwives' rates of 6.85 per cent in 1931 he wrote: "The higher rate in the latter service is due to the fact that the midwives are compelled by the patient or relatives to summon the doctor (in many cases unnecessarily) to terminate the labour".72 Shorter has repeated this uncritically, referring to the nurse-midwives' rate as more than twice that of several big London hospitals.73 This is to disregard not only the totally different circumstances of the two types of practice, but also Kerr's description of the East End and York Road hospitals, which he characterized as small, and staffed by midwives in supervised training.
By 1933, the official reports had opened to wider discussion the shortcomings of midwifery in medical training and general practice that had long been of concern to 68 Shorter, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 153 The calls for medical aid bear closer examination. Fees were not guaranteed when midwives were first required to call for aid; local authorities' supervision took some years to become regularized; the enforcement of the CMB's rules was tightened up in the 1920s, entailing more precautionary calls.75 Although Kerr and Fairbairn both held the securing of natural delivery to be the criterion of good midwifery, midwives' training stressed the importance of recognizing signs of potential difficulty, and high rates of calls for aid were interpreted in some quarters as evidence of alert midwifery and good quality of care.76
The nurse-midwives' call-out rate of 26 per cent for 1925 (little different from that for all midwives) is not remarkable in the changing administrative context. If it may be assumed that the calls for reasons other than delays or difficulties in labour were uncontentious, and that the ones which ended in forceps deliveries were justified even if the interventions were not, then the nurse-midwives erred on the side of caution in no more than one in three calls. In 1933, Kerr remarked on the continued increase in calls for aid without speculating whether publicity about maternal mortality might have influenced mothers' and midwives' behaviour. Neither he nor Fairbairn, who had noted that more precautionary calls were being encouraged, mentioned that medical aid need not have led to medical intervention, or cited evidence that doctors complained of needless calls.
The story of importunate clients is as open to question as that of irresolute midwives. Kerr attributed the rising incidence of institutional confinements-about one in every four when his work was published-partly to some women's fear of complications and it is also likely that others who wanted to be sure of having their home confinements eased by aids not available to midwives would book doctors. Shorter has cited Flora Thompson's memories of village women's stoicism in childbirth as part of an outdated Victorian culture, but the stigma said to have been attached to accepting anaesthesia in a London lying-in hospital, and the recollections of women who had babies in the 1920s and 1930s, suggest that medical intervention and relief from pain continued to carry some sense of maternal failure.77 An informant's story of her uncomplicated birth's having been "the talk of the street" in 74 Campbell, Maternal warning, that its data on cases where nurse-midwives acted as maternity nurses were not from first-hand reports and so should be treated with reserve, "the nurse always knows whether the mother lived or died".80 So did her family and friends.
But mothers, families, and midwives were all viewed as scapegoats, despite the nurse-midwives' low maternal mortality rates. The comparisons of nurse-midwives' work with that of London lying-in hospitals implied that women with more confident midwives and less insistent friends would have suffered less from the unwise interventions which, it seems to have been assumed, doctors made on demanddespite the superior medical knowledge that was their rationale for being there at all. Perhaps because of doubts about general practitioners' capacity for antenatal work, neither Kerr nor Fairbairn raised the possibility that guaranteed fees for antenatal treatment might have shifted some calls for aid from the "labour" to the "pregnancy" category and resulted in more prearranged admissions to hospital. General practitioners' inadequate training and inexperience were certainly implicated, but outright censure was rare. More typical are references to the disadvantageous circumstances that doctors might contend with in domestic confinements; Mabel Dobbin Crawford's study of 100 "failed forceps" cases in Liverpool is exceptional for its strong and explicit criticism of general practitioners and their training.8' Andrew
Topping is on record as saying that many maternal deaths were nothing short of murder, but the published note of the meeting of Medical Officers of Health which he addressed gives no details of the "glaring examples" which he described in discussion.82
The Midwives Committee's comments on medical students' midwifery training, which follow its findings on the state of the midwifery profession, give pause for thought. The Committee found that there were too many independent midwives to be maintained in full-time practice, but they were crowded in the towns and often working part-time. "Little-practice" or "pin-money" midwives were thought to depress the general level of fees and likely to give a poorer service than full-timers. Rural areas were served by district nursing associations or not at all. There was ample evidence of independent midwifery's limitations as a career: low earnings, day and night commitment in all weathers, early incapacity, no provision for old age, oppressive supervision, the anxieties of private practice. Candidates were often qualified nurses wanting a midwifery certificate so as to follow an occupation requiring the double qualification or to enhance their career prospects. Of 2,811 candidates in 1928, 1,730 had nursing qualifications and the rest were expected to take up salaried employment rather than independent practice.
The Midwives Committee referred disapprovingly to nurses who sought a midwifery certificate as "an ornament" to their professional qualifications. In acquiring it for so frivolous a reason they monopolized the "beds" or "clinical material" (parturient women) that medical students needed for a proper training in midwifery. The Committee's language, like Eardley Holland's in his history of midwifery in medical education, presented the matter as if it were within the pupil midwives' control. "These women absorb a considerable amount of the training material to the detriment of the interests of medical students in schools which are sometimes hard pressed to obtain adequate facilities ... students in a medical school ... should have preference in the apportionment of material ... If pupil midwives ... are not able to obtain a sufficient number of cases to qualify for entrance to the examination of the Central Midwives Board they should go elsewhere..."; "The pupil[ midwive]s came first and the
[medical] students' share was as a rule only a small and totally inadequate one".84 Not only were midwives at fault if women in their care fell victims to medical accidents at the hands ofdoctors called out under the CMB's rules, they were also to blame for such doctors' inadequate training.
Nothing was said about how a midwifery certificate unsupported by post-qualifying experience had come to be a passport to lucrative posts, nor what determined the allocation ofbeds so that the pupil midwives had such a great advantage in the teaching hospitals where the shortage was most acute. According to Holland, the medical curriculum was already too full at the turn of the century to allow for more midwifery. Anecdotes abound on the subject of its casual treatment well into the 1920s.85 Topping was candid about his lack of experience before he took charge of several antenatal clinics, despite the "somewhat perfunctory"' course in antenatal work included in his studies for the Diploma in Public Health: "By dint of native guile I In effect, the Act implemented the recommendations of the independent Joint Council on Midwifery, set up in 1934 at the instance of the National Birthday Trust and representing Medical Officers of Health, general practitioners, midwives, obstetricians, and gynaecologists. Given the disarray in the midwifery profession, the new Midwives Bill was uncontroversial, even though the British Medical Association complained that the Joint Council's report was released before its members had time to consult their parent bodies.88 But its objections were too insubstantial to delay the legislation.
The Act required local authorities to provide enough full-time, salaried midwives to meet all needs, either by direct employment or through voluntary agency. The principal innovation (for local authorities were already empowered to support and employ midwives) was for the retirement and compensation of independent midwives who were not to be employed in the new service or to continue in private practice, an uncertain prospect with competition from the public sector.
The other provision both major and new was the prohibition of unqualified maternity nursing, directed at the "handywomen" whose attendance was believed to extend to conducting deliveries with doctors' collusion. It meant loss of livelihood for some women whose maternity nursing was not a cover for illegal midwifery, but it was easier to prohibit their activity than to enforce sanctions against conniving doctors; the Ministry of Health's advice had always been that any maternity nursing provided by local authorities under the permissive powers of the Maternal and Child Welfare Act of 1918 should be by women with midwifery qualifications.
The BMA, possibly aware that recommendations unfavourable to its members might emerge from research then reaching completion, expressed concern that a service centred on local authorities might exclude general practitioners, but it had no grounds for resisting a proposal aligned with long-standing policies for developing local authorities' maternity and child welfare services.89 Local authorities set charges for midwifery and were empowered to recover them. They tended to be at the upper end of the range quoted for nursing associations at the end of the 1920s: £2 or more for a first birth. The Ministry of Health estimated that fees averaging £1.5s.0d. per case would be recovered at the outset, with the authorities sustaining net costs of 170-180 per annum for each midwife employed; midwives' pay compared reasonably with health visitors' and was a considerable advance on the independent midwife's expectations ofnet earnings.90 The Midwives Committee's recommendations had been 88 PRO MH80/13, representations on the Midwives Bill, 1936; correspondence with the BMA, January 1936. 89 Ibid.
directed to securing the supply of midwives by enhancing their professional status; public employment now stood to have the desired effect through its pay and pensions, and career prospects within midwifery for nurses with midwifery qualifications. But the new policy meant the virtual disappearance of independent midwives. Although the principle of women's free choice of medical attendant was affirmed in the planning of the Midwives Act of 1936, municipal midwifery has been said to have resulted in general practitioners' obstetrics being limited to a minority who became especially experienced.9' The explanation for this perception lies in the aftermath of a special investigation into maternal mortality that was nearing completion as the Act went through.
OCCASIONAL CALAMITIES
The investigation was into the causes of deaths in places with maternal mortality rates exceeding 5 per 1,000 live births for the period from 1924 to 1933; Halifax led the English league table with 7.05 and the rates for Wales were so high as to justify a separate inquiry.92 Official, professional, and popular publications combined, round about the time of the inquiries, to offer reassurances on the subject of death in childbirth, with the medical press "[supporting] the government's view that the problem was administrative and scientific, demanding specialist study rather than popular debate".93 Women's magazines in 1936 took different routes to reassurance, Home Notes by avoiding the topic as something sensible wives should not get "all hot and bothered" about; Woman's Own by a series of articles that included references to statistics' being misleading although "every now and then ... a calamity occurred".94
In fact, the chief recommendation prompted by the investigation, but never published, was that some doctors should be barred from midwifery. At the end of 1936 Sir Arthur MacNalty and Sir Comyns Berkeley, both relatively new appointees to their offices as Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health and Chairman of the CMB, respectively, on the retirements of Sir George Newman and John Shields Fairbairn, agreed with senior officials at the Ministry that some general practitioners were too inexperienced to practise midwifery. Under the CMB's rules, midwives calling for medical aid were bound to respect the mother's choice, but local authorities might want some control over the choice of doctors called by their salaried midwives and the London County Council had already raised the issue. The College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists favoured restriction of choice; Sir Comyns Berkeley thought the BMA could be convinced and the CMB's rules changed. There was full agreement that the publication of particulars of individual cases was undesirable, for fear of alarming mothers. So a revised form of the report's conclusions was agreed for publication, and a confidential report put in hand for the BMA.95 91 Walker, op. cit., note 46 above, p. 347. 92 Ministry of Health, Maternal Mortality in Wales, note I above. 93 It was a short, selective presentation.96 The full study covered 669 deaths, 101 deaths from abortion having been excluded. Private doctors were responsible for the supervision of 55.9 per cent of cases; most had been engaged for the confinement. There were 73 deaths from eclampsia, essentially preventable, and supervision had been careful in only 9 of the 43 eclampsia cases that were attended by doctors. Doctors had been responsible for the antenatal care of 24 of these cases; and midwives had made antenatal referrals in 6 others. Examples of unsatisfactory care included failures to test urine, to take blood pressure and to recognize the import of symptoms; table 2 analyses the 109 deaths from sepsis. Forceps were applied in 48 of the 71 home confinements with doctors present, with more than one application in 8 cases. Of these, 4 deliveries were accomplished at home and 4 in hospital by forceps, craniotomy, and Caesarean section. There were 8 cases of severe lacerations of the perineum, complete to the rectum in 5 cases and with additional tearing in 4, and evidence of lack of care or error ofjudgement in cases of haemorrhage.
Short accounts of a sample of 18 cases were provided, exemplifying unskilled midwifery (6 cases), inadequate antenatal supervision (5), errors ofjudgement (4) and late admission to hospital (3).
General practitioners had been booked for all but three of the confinements in the sample. One of these cases was classified as unskilled midwifery: delivery was in a local hospital, by Caesarean section, undertaken by a general practitioner after the woman had been attended by two others in a municipal maternity home. Another was a case of inadequate antenatal supervision by a doctor who, without detecting pregnancy, treated a patient for three weeks after which she was admitted to hospital suffering from vomiting and fits. She died, 28 weeks pregnant. The third was a late admission to hospital after a midwife called medical aid for a breech presentation. Doctors' inadequate antenatal supervision included failures to test urine and take blood-pressures, and errors of judgement included a ruptured ectopic pregnancy diagnosed as a gastric ulcer, mismanagement of haemorrhage, and a doctor's failure to ensure complete delivery or obtain a consultant's assistance before leaving the patient.
"Late admission to hospital" often meant delay until death was inevitable, and the best of hospital care would have been unavailing. The three sample cases included a woman who had been ill throughout her three-and-a-half months' pregnancy and bedridden for her last month of life. For a week, her family "begged" the doctor to send her to hospital, after which the Medical Officer from the local authority's Maternity and Child Welfare service arranged admission but, by then jaundiced and near-comatose, she died two days later.
The other cases were the woman who arrived at hospital dying of sepsis and one who died from shock after a difficult labour ended by Caesarean section. She had been under the antenatal care of the doctor who referred her to hospital after three days of labour, when the pelvic condition that caused her difficulties was first diagnosed.
The confidential report acknowledged that general practitioners were likely to be handicapped by unsuitable surroundings, inadequate assistance, pressure of other calls, and patients whose condition demanded immediate action; and that some case histories showed that careful obstetric procedures had been followed. Another, somewhat back-handed softening of the report's strictures on general practice was its observation that whilst many hospitals gave efficient treatment, some were not of a high standard, often with no obstetrician on the senior staff and where difficult confinements were conducted by juniors. Doctors' declining opportunity for becoming experienced in obstetrics was mentioned in connection with falling birth rates, more institutional confinements, and more attendance by midwives.
According to the researchers, some doctors could not get enough midwifery practice to become efficient. It was sometimes confined to medical aid cases, and doctors attending a few abnormal confinements a year could not bring to them the judgement and experience they required. Many of the deaths that were investigated might have been avoided by experienced practitioners, specialized obstetric assistance or earlier admission to hospital.
The discussions surrounding the confidential report concentrated on the CMB's rule that medical aid in midwives' cases should be by doctors of the patients' or their families' choice, even though the proportion of doctors' cases in the investigation was unrepresentatively high. Institutional and midwives' cases must have accounted for more than 80 per cent of all confinements, but nearly 55 per cent of the ones investigated were doctors' cases. There were 15 doctors' cases in the sample of 18 and a doctor implicated in one of the others. The BMA was first consulted in December 1936, with reference to 18 per cent as the proportion of all confinements entailing calls for medical aid, and was thought to be amenable to the calls being restricted to doctors trained or experienced in obstetrics.97 Later the BMA hardened its line and stood out for its own version of a maternity service that, the Ministry said, would cut across the system of over 1,600 antenatal clinics that had developed over the previous fifteen years, and agreed to local panels of practitioners available for midwifery only on condition that they would be self-selected.98 The Ministry recommended local authorities to set up committees to advise on standards of practice,99 and, more significantly, the CMB's rule about the choice of doctors for medical aid was rescinded.
Frank Honigsbaum's account of general practitioners' long resistance to tests of specialist competence and insistence that "all GPs are equal" suggests that the Ministry's initial assessment of the BMA's favourable attitude to midwifery panels was ill-founded.-l°Few panels eventuated and local authorities tended to rely on the informal selection of preferred practitioners that was possible without the CMB's constraining rule. Arnold L. Walker, who followed Sir Comyns Berkeley as Chairman of the CMB, wrote in 1954 that, by the end of the 1930s, general practitioners' midwifery was, in effect, limited to experienced doctors. A "body of general-practitioner-obstetricians ... has developed spontaneously'".10
By this account, then, there was no conflict, no administrative intervention, no demand management, no influence by way of the CMB's change of its rules: rather, the orderly evolution of an ever-improving service by way of rational consensus. But by the time the National Health Service was launched and more than half of all confinements were in hospitals, general practitioners attended very few in response to calls for aid; the 15 per cent or so which they accounted for were mostly by prior booking and not within local authorities' control. But were obstetricians' emphasis on the hospitalization which, by 1944, they advised for 70 per cent of all births, and Sir George Newman's direction of official interest to clinical causation entirely disinterested?'04 To point out that the Ministry exploited the emotive issue of mothers' needless deaths to promote a particular kind of maternity service is not to question Newman's genuine, humanitarian concern; but his reluctance, and that of the professional team led by him, to address related issues is telling. Neither the shortcomings of the independent research nor the lack of direct correlation between variations within the death-rates and indicators of deprivation were sufficient reasons for ruling out nutrition as a factor to be studied. And there was enough evidence of maltreatment to have justified more detailed research on midwifery in general practice, with particular reference to maternal morbidity and disablement. There might have been some action on these fronts had maternal mortality been the "public scandal" which Loudon has described-"from the beginning of this century [ No doubt Sir Comyns Berkeley and Sir Arthur MacNalty were sincere in their concern for women's peace of mind, and the BMA's firm stance on self-selection may well have been part of a public-relations strategy that covered its agreement to the changes in the CMB's rule about calls for medical aid, but they left some women unnecessarily exposed to bad practice. The "sensible wife" who bought the staider women's magazines might reasonably have supposed that a doctor's higher fees meant better care than a midwife's; although her chances of death from a bad choice may have been only slightly increased, she may have been putting her future health at significantly greater hazard. Nineteen of the 88 survivors in Mrs Dobbin Crawford's study of 100 "failed forceps" cases were classified as "morbid"; Honigsbaum has cited a contemporary opinion that specialists' doctrines about the inadvisability of forceps in the 1930s did not deter general practitioners." '1 The medical knights offered no protection to the woman who booked a doctor for a home confinement, and childbirth remained safer for poor East Enders than for women in well-heeled Hampstead. A recent statistical reconsideration, necessarily inconclusive in default of data whereby to test the hypothesis, suggests that the inverse association between maternal mortality rates and indicators of deprivation in London boroughs, and maternal death-rate tabulations related to social class in the Registrar-General's Decennial Supplement for 1930-1932 may reflect the fact that the effects of poverty were less dangerous than risky medical intervention with the better-off."12 There was a persuasive case for restricting the publication of material which might be turned to sensational effect, but Topping's account of women as eager for information and well able to assimilate it suggests that concealing the descriptive content of the special investigations' findings rather than seeking their unsensational dissemination, which could have led women to safer choices and strengthened the Ministry's hand on the question of midwifery panels, was vastly more culpable than chancing disproportionate public alarm.
Maternal mortality's rise and fall as a defined social problem may be read in terms of medical self-protection and control not only by reference to medical care itself, but also to interprofessional relationships. A full analysis of the implications for the midwifery profession is not possible here, but this paper does demonstrate the illogic of blaming midwives for doctors' actions and the inconsistency of the standards applied to midwives' practice, even by those who asserted its value. Fairbairn noted the increased expectation of precautionary calls for medical aid; Kerr's prescriptions for routine hospitalization would have removed far more cases from home than were referred to doctors; yet they both deplored the increasing incidence of medical aid.
Professor Blair Bell, whose eminence has been noted in the first part of this paper, was no friend to "the present class" of midwife. In 1931, when he advocated a differently trained, hospital-based practitioner, he had to counter arguments that cited domiciliary midwives' good records in Britain and in Scandinavian countries with similar training systems."13 He said that about 30 per cent of Swedish confinements were in hospitals, against six to eight per cent in Britain, and that the credit given to English and Welsh midwives did not allow for the aid they called for in about 25 per cent of their cases, with many not knowing enough to call for it in time. The rate for hospitalized confinements in England and Wales was approaching 24 per cent; Fairbairn's statistics included "medical aid cases" as midwives'; Bell offered no evidence for deviating from his fellow obstetricians' judgements that midwives called for aid too early and too often. The obstetricians" modes of argument, from Kerr's elision of inference and evidence about impatient families, through the variously partisan interpretations of calls for medical aid, to Bell's dubious use of statistics suggest that, when professional interests were at issue, ratiocination fell short of the standards expected of medico-scientific research.
Midwives had little influence over the Midwives Act of 1936, drafted when concern about the maternal mortality rates was at its highest and a remarkably radical reform was acceptable to the public. Financially, midwives did well out of it, but it reconstructed their occupational identity in ways which, indirectly and in combination with the increasing trend towards institutional confinement, produced a practitioner who had more in common with Blair Bell's ideal of a nurse with additional midwifery training than with the single-qualified women whose work comes out so well in Fairbairn's analysis. Questions remain about whether the outcomes of decisions taken in the 1930s, both in the shorter and the longer term, were in the best interests either of midwives or mothers, and the extent to which their undoubted favouring of the medical profession was in the public interest.
Obstetricians Detached observers adduce evidence of demand for hospitalization, the different constructions that may be put on it, and the weaknesses in statistics-based arguments on both sides.'16 It is worth noting that the obstetricians' bitter disappointment at the National Health Service's midwifery provisions was short-lived. Their recommendation of hospital beds for 70 per cent of births became official policy in 1959, when the proportion already exceeded 60 per cent; it was fulfilled by 1965.117
The incidence ofmaternal mortality in this country is now too low to be any kind of index,1 18 but maternity services conditioned by it are the focus of today's impassioned debates, and reviewing past experiences may help in present troubles. A recent and careful consideration has drawn attention to the way in which policy on maternity care has been formed with very little reference to evidence;' 19 that such conclusions are not unusual in policy analysis is all the more reason for investigating the particular, circumstantial factors that have carried the day.
